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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Olds Properties Corporation ("Olds") seeks 
review of a final order of the Second Judicial District Court 
for Davis County, denying Olds1 motion for temporary injunction 
and granting respondent Unisys Corporation's motion to dismiss. 
Unisys contests this court's jurisdiction over the 
appeal because Olds has failed to file its notice of appeal 
within the time provided by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 4 of the rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Unisys contests the statement of issues presented for 
review contained in Olds1 brief. Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Unisys submits the 
following statement of issues presented for review. 
1. Was the appeal filed out of time or, in the 
alternative, was this appeal taken from an order which was not 
final? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
finding no irreparable harm? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying 01dsf motion for injunctive relief? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action was brought by Olds seeking injunctive 
relief. Olds originally sought an injunction preventing Unisys 
from "altering" a building in Davis County. (Verified Complaint 
at page 7). At a hearing, however, Olds limited relief it 
sought to an injunction preventing Unisys from removing 
equipment and improvements from the premises without prior 
authorization from Olds. (Tr. II at pp. 8, 9, and 17). The 
Second Judicial District Court in Davis County denied Olds1 
motion for injunction and granted Unisys1 motion to dismiss. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
This action was commenced on July 30, 1987 when 
Appellant Olds Properties, Inc. filed a Verified Complaint 
seeking injunctive relief in the Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County (R.I.1-93). A temporary restraining order 
was entered on July 30, 1987 (R.104-06), and was thereafter 
extended by stipulation of the parties and further order of the 
Court (R.I.109-11). On August 21, 1987 Unisys moved to dismiss 
the Complaint for Preliminary Injunction (R.I.112-195). A 
hearing was held on August 24, 1987 on Olds' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction. At the end of the day on August 24, 
the parties again stipulated, subject to certain terms and 
conditions placed in the record in open court, to the extension 
of the temporary restraining order until further hearing could 
be held on Olds Properties' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
(Tr. I, 59-64). Another hearing was held on the Olds1 
Preliminary Injunction Motion and Unisys' Motion to Dismiss the 
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Complaint throughout the afternoon of September 28, 1987. At 
the conclusion of the September 28 hearing, the Court announced 
its findings and stated that it had decided to deny the Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction and to grant the Motion to Dismiss 
the Complaint (Tr. II, 116-120). Counsel for Unisys was 
directed to prepare a Judgment reflecting these decisions. 
There followed a period of negotiation between counsel for the 
parties regarding both the form of order and the possibility of 
settling the entire dispute which culminated in a jointly 
agreed upon form of Judgment which was entered on December 21, 
1987 (R.II.434-35). 
On November 10, 1987, after the District Court 
announced its decision at the September 28 hearing, but before 
formal entry of Judgment, Unisys filed a Counterclaim for 
declaratory relief. Olds Properties responded by a Motion to 
Dismiss which was granted by the court's "Ruling on Motion to 
Dismiss dated February 10, 1988 (R.II.464-65), confirmed by 
entry of a judgment dated March 17, 1988 (R.II. 473-74). 
C. Statement of Facts 
In March, 1964, Deshon Properties Corp., ("Deshon"), 
leased a building located in Davis County, Utah, to General 
Motors Corporation. In December,- 1972, General Motors 
subleased for the building to Sperry Rand Corporation, 
predecessor in interest to Unisys. When Sperry took possession 
-3-
in 1972, the building was essentially a warehouse (Tr. I. pp. 
14-15; Jan 1973 PHOTOS, R II page 416). Before the end of 
1972, Sperry had converted the building to a manufacturing 
facility by adding extensive partitioning, equipment and 
machinery (Tr. I. pp. 15-16; March 1973 PHOTOS, R II page 
415). Through a series of transactions Olds eventually 
acquired the interests of both Deshon and General Motors in 
March, 1986. In December, 1984, Unisys executed a document 
styled Tenant Estoppel Certification and Attornment (the 
"Attornment"). In 1986, Olds and Unisys entered a document 
styled Lease Extension Agreement. The interrelationship 
between the lease, sublease, attornment and lease extension 
define the rights and interests of Olds and Unisys. Paragraph 
10.02 of the 1964 lease provides: 
It is understood and agreed that the Lessee, 
from time to time during the term of this Lease 
or any extension thereof, may install machinery, 
equipment and fixtures of various kinds and 
description for the purpose of carrying on its 
business, and upon any of such machinery, 
equipment and fixtures being so installed in or 
placed on the leased premises by the Lessee the 
same shall remain at all times the property of 
the Lessee, and, at any time during the term or 
any extension or extensions thereof and at the 
termination of the Lease or any extension or 
extensions thereof, the Lessee shall be entitled 
to remove any and all of such machinery, 
equipment and fixtures; provided, however, that 
if any machinery and equipment is so attached to 
any building or buildings so as not to be readily 
removable without damage to the building or 
buildings, then, in such event, if the Lessee 
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shall remove the same, the Lessee shall promptly 
repair and replace any damage caused to the 
building or buildings by such removal. If the 
Lessee shall exercise its right to renew this 
Lease beyond the initial term for any extended 
term or terms it shall not be necessary for the 
Lessee to reserve its right to such machinery, 
equipment and fixtures or their removal, 
(emphasis added). 
The 1972 sublease contains the following provision at 
paragraph 17: 
,fThis sublease is expressly made subject to all 
the terms and conditions of said underlying lease 
and the lessee agrees to use the premises in 
accordance with the terms of the underlying 
lease." Paragraph 20 and 21 of the sublease 
provide as follows: 
Repairs - The Lessee's expense shall keep the 
premises including the grounds, buildings, 
structures and improvements thereon in good order 
and condition and shall make all repairs, 
replacements and improvements required, 
structural or otherwise. The Lessee will at the 
expiration of this Lease, surrender and deliver 
said premises with the building and aforesaid 
improvements, appurtenances and equipment in 
good order and condition, reasonable wear and 
tear excepted. The Lessee agrees not to call 
upon the Lessor at any time during the term of 
this Lease to make any repairs or replacements of 
any part of the premises or improvements thereon, 
whether structural or otherwise, this being a Net 
Lease. The intention being that the rent 
received by the Lessor shall be free of any 
expense in connection with the care, maintenance, 
operation or repair of the premises or any 
improvements thereon. 
Alterations - That Lessee will not make any 
alterations or add any construction whatsoever to 
the premises without the prior written consent of 
the Lessor, and in each instance, such request 
for consent shall include a set of plans, 
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specifications and cost of any contemplated 
improvement, and if the Lessee makes any 
alterations or adds any construction, such 
additional construction or alterations shall be 
removed at the expiration of the term and the 
premises shall be restored at the sole expense 
of the Lessee to the condition existing prior to 
Lessee's taking possession, except for 
improvements of the following nature which shall 
remain on the premises at the time Lessee vacates 
the premises: 
(1) Any additions, expansions, or alterations to 
restrooms. 
(2) Changes in interior layout to produce a 
cafeteria and lunchroom. 
(3) Heating and air conditioning units installed 
in the roof of the warehouse. 
(4) Any column mounted power distribution 
equipment or any main power feeds brought into 
the building. 
(5) Any fencing done to the property, 
(6) The Lessee may pave a portion of the 
''expansion area," located on the north side of 
the building. The Lessee must submit detailed 
plans and specifications for this paving, and the 
Lessor agrees to share in the cost of this paving 
on a 50/50 basis with its share not to exceed 
$8,000.00, payment to be made upon submission to 
the Lessor of paid invoices along with lien 
waivers from all subcontractors. (emphasis 
added). 
In 1986, after Olds acquired title to the building, 
Olds negotiated a lease extension agreement with Unisys. That 
lease extension agreement specifically and narrowly amended the 
language of paragraph 21 of the sublease as follows: 
-6-
Effective as of the 27th day of March, 1986 
and in consideration of the premises and the 
mutual covenants herein contained, the parties 
agree to modify the terms and conditions of that 
sublease as follows: 
. . . 2. Clause TWENTY-FIRST, Paragraph 6, is 
modified by adding the following sentence: 
"In addition to the above described paving, 
the 1983 parking expansion is excepted from 
this clause TWENTY-FIRST." 
The lease expires March 31, 1989. In the latter part 
of 1986, Unisys discontinued manufacturing activities at the 
building. In 1987, Unisys began removing certain equipment and 
began restoration of the property to its original condition in 
accordance with the terms of the lease. Olds then filed its 
complaint seeking to enjoin Unisys from removing machinery and 
equipment or from restoring the building to its pre-lease 
condition. 
After argument regarding interpretation of the lease 
provisions, and after an evidentiary hearing, the court below 
entered findings. The court found that Unisys' activities 
constituted the type of restoration called for by paragraph 21 
of the sublease. The court further held that Olds had failed 
to establish any irreparable harm from the conduct of Unisys, 
and that to the extent Olds might be injured by Unisys1 
conduct, any injury would be compensable through money damages 
or by an appropriate action at law (Tr. II at pp. 115-120). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Olds advances three arguments on appeal. First, Olds 
argues the court erred by finding Olds could not waive the 
restoration provision of the lease. Second, Olds argues that 
the court erred by excluding certain evidence regarding 
"course-of-dealing." Finally, Olds argues that the court has 
misinterpreted the documents comprising the lease particularly 
relating to the attornment agreement. 
All of these arguments are founded on a faulty 
premise. Olds repeatedly represents in its brief that the 
trial court found the kind of injury requisite to entry of 
injunctive relief. See Olds' brief at pgs. 2, 5 and 8. Olds1 
brief misrepresents the record. The court below clearly held 
that Olds had failed to establish any harm sufficient to 
warrant injunctive relief. (Tr. II at pp. 116-120). 
The critical inquiry on this appeal is whether the 
court below abused its discretion in finding no irreparable 
harm. The sole evidence presented by Olds relating to 
irreparable injury had to do with damage to the concrete floor 
of the warehouse. The court below properly found that even if 
Unisys caused damage to the floor, such damage would not 
constitute waste, could readily be repaired by Unisys and would 
in any event be compensable in money damages. (Tr. II at pp. 
116-120). Based on the record before this court on appeal, 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Olds' Appeal Is Not Timely, Or In The Alternative, Is 
From An Order Which Was Not Final. 
In its February 10 ruling on Olds1 Motion to Dismiss 
the Unisys Counterclaim (R.II 464-65), the District Court 
concluded "At the time the Counterclaim was filed there was no 
action before the Court to counterclaim against." This 
conclusion is in turn based on the factual premise that "the 
Court orally granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the 
plaintiff's Complaint on September 28, 1987." If the District 
Court's February 10 ruling is correct, it follows that Olds' 
January 19, 1988 Notice of Appeal fails to comply with Rule 
4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and this appeal should 
be dismissed for that reason. 
In the alternative, respondent Unisys contends that 
this appeal should be dismissed as premature because the Order 
appealed from is not final within the scope and meaning of Rule 
3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and is not, therefore, 
appealable. 
As indicated above, the Complaint for Preliminary 
Injunction, the Motion to Dismiss that Complaint, and the 
Unisys Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief all raise issues, 
the resolution of which depends on the interpretation of the 
same series of agreements pertaining to the same building in 
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v. Marathon Steel, 692 P.2d 765 at 768 (Utah, 1984); Little 
v. Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 at 919 (Utah, 1979). 
Proper determination of whether the final judgment has 
been rendered depends upon the facts of the particular case. 
In this case, the facts show that the District Court had before 
it in this action conflicting claims with respect to the 
central question of which party owned the interior walls and 
constructed improvements in the building at issue. [Compare 
provisions of pleadings - Complaint, 1117 (R.I. 6) with 
Counterclaim, Us 18-19 and Us 1 and 2 of prayer for relief 
(R.423-25).] The parties sought differing relief based on 
their conflicting positions with respect to that issue. Olds 
Properties sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting Unisys 
from removing improvements which it claimed were its property. 
Thus alerted to the Olds1 position, and recognizing the 
potential for a claim for damages arising out of this same 
issue, Unisys sought declaratory relief adjudicating that the 
lease documents provided that it was the owner of the 
improvements and could, therefore, remove them without legally 
damaging Olds. 
Where the parties seek varying forms of relief which 
depend on the resolution of a single underlying claim (here the 
ownership question), any judgment which disposes of some but 
not all of the forms of relief requested is not final and not 
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An injunction may be granted: 
(1) When it appears by the pleadings on file 
that a party is entitled to the relief demanded, 
and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in 
restraining the commission or continuance of some 
act complained of, either for a limited period or 
perpetually; 
(2) When it appears from the pleadings or by 
affidavit that the commission or continuance of 
some act during the litigation would produce 
great or irreparable injury to the party seeking 
injunctive relief; 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that 
either party is doing or threatens, or is about 
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, 
some act in violation of the rights of another 
party respecting the subject matter of the 
action, and tending to render the judgment 
ineffectual; 
(4) In all other cases where an injunction would 
be proper in equity. 
Rule 65A(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 65A does not necessarily require a finding of 
only one or more than one of these grounds. Rather, "the 
moving party must show sufficient of the foregoing grounds to 
convince the trial court to exercise its discretion in favor of 
entering the injunction/' System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 425. 
While other factors are relevant and important, a 
showing of irreparable injury is crucial; "if the moving party 
is unable to show that the commission or continuance of some 
act during the litigation would produce great or irreparable 
injury, the motion for injunction "will usually be denied, 
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i i a L rns I i< i' • i. "i i .. i s c a u s i n g p e r m a n e n t d a m a g e ' fina l i>» , 
Olds bootstraps its own « haracterization in* i .t i unchisnr 
s t at emenf that the i mil I 111111 i 111 111 < i i \> . a i i 11 d t m t w \'\ I 1: 
f'-'lMji' " i , ifi| '.w ' i . laim tor in m n c t i v e reliel >JJ !• 
brief at page u In n) doing, Olds has misrepresented both 
the evidentiary record and tin t mini HUH HI i i i j rj i 
C H I ' I Tim mi |IMM » iijijii p r e s e n t e d r e g a r d i n g d a m a g e to 
the building was the testimony of Randy Rogers, an irchitect. 
Mr. Rogers testified fh.it I nisvs war. M HUM im n.iii .i d 
with i n <. I« i ' i 11 e 'I*,' .1 rehouse. Rogers 
testi.ii.ed thai. I. he partitions could not be removed without some 
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damage to the floor. However, responding to a question from 
the court, Mr. Rogers candidly admitted that such damage could 
readily be repaired; 
Q: Is it possible to take those bolts out without 
damaging the floor? 
A: No. 
THE COURT: Is it possible to repair the floor after 
you take them out? 
A: The question he asked I answered "no." The 
question you ask, yes, itfs capable of repairing. (Tr. II., p. 
93, lines 11-17). 
The issue was further clarified on cross examination 
when Mr. Rogers stated that any structural damage to the 
warehouse floor would have been caused when bolts were 
installed in the floor. (Tr. II at 105). Mr. Rogers then 
testified that once bolts were removed, the concrete could be 
repaired and walls could be re-installed in exactly the same 
place; 
Q: Well, assuming that the concrete floor is 
otherwise sound and uncracked, with the exception of the bottom 
hole that went in and the bolt that came out and the patch that 
was placed, assuming this floor as you observed is in sound 
condition, how far away do you have to move before the concrete 
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l.here is going l:;u he unaffected by what: happened in the 
original location? 
A: You c m yut ill."1 i J i I ! '! I. i Minus, r'i.1 
Q: ' So, the answer wuulJ be zero? 
A: Zern Mi 1! p 1 Oh , mine *iJ thru p. 10/, line 
£ o u n s e ^ ^ ^ ^ t rQ a r g u e o n this record that 
Unisys was committing nwastetf and that irreparable miurj 
should be presumed1 (Ir. i at inn iiih iR I i II nil IIHIII 
in i i in mi ID I,1 mi i i, mi i i ijiiirt spe critically rejected this argument. 
(Tr, 11 at p 1 'In' in The court found some damage HI the I nu cf 
holes where the partitions had been umbo I t> il I  null II iiiiiiiiiill in 
""
,
 !» .•••. 'I1'. he repaired t, the end rl the term.. 
Photos supplied by the plaintiff do show that 
therefs removal of machinery, equipment, walls 
and there is some damage because of that. Of 
course, the defendant has not turned the premise 
back to the plaintiffs yet and, apparently, is 
still paying its rents. And so, because there i,» 
some damage to the building, that does not mean 
it will not be corrected before it gets it back, 
I donf t believe the defendant is required to w.ir'l 
until the last day of the lease before it 
corrects the building and puts if hack in shapu 
The coar-i i len e x p r e s s l y h e l d t h a t "whillr t h e 
mi (I iiiiagi" i , t h e r e i s n o t h i n g h e r e t h a t 
i s irrefc .c damage, M I hern i s anv damage thev s u f f e r , 
t h e r e does appear to be an adequa t e remedy at law, Any damage 
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the defendant does to the building will not be of such a nature 
that it can't be paid for in money damages. (Tr. II 119, 120 
(emphasis added)). 
The entire premise of Olds1 brief is that the court 
found irreparable injury. In light of the record, however, 
that premise is faulty. As the court's findings are not 
against the weight of evidence and are based on the record, 
Olds cannot demonstrate any abuse of discretion. The trial 
court's ruling must, therefore, be affirmed. 
Ill. Olds1 Waiver Argument Raises A False Issue 
Olds argues at length that it is free to waive the 
restoration requirement of paragraph twenty-first of the 
sublease. The argument adds nothing to 01dsf appeal, however, 
because Olds has presented no evidence that it did in fact 
waive the restoration obligation. Indeed, the evidence on this 
point shows that Olds had not waived the restoration obligation 
despite having been asked by Unisys to do so. Olds devotes 
fully one half of its argument to the issue of whether or not 
it could waive restoration, but the only reference to whether 
or not it actually waived is set forth on page 11 of Olds' 
brief, where Olds disingenuously argues that by seeking an 
injunction it "engaged in conduct consistent with its right to 
waive." (Olds' brief at 11). Nowhere else does Olds even 
suggest that it waived the restoration requirement. To the 
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apport 
. ' .
 rt a , . * r * hr , M f '-in <L- -quesr by n 
for 01- fl' wa; !vt* restoration. Had u^ .Js a^ae ^ , Lhib d]sc,:te 
would uav* 
Exhibit. ,. ;-- attached as \ddendums A x-.' 
They are ' w ettt: • • ^ • m in ^ v<; d-t-^ d 'V---^- '986 
and February t 
Sperry is ^>L+„> : t. complete tue restoration 
of the facility in accordance with the p^ovisLOTS 
of il.f restoration paragraph unless you ^s 
landlord waive this right \ :th regard to 
landlord's right to waive, . T"iterf *" 
warv.r.^ - the entire clause 
youi sition on rhe restoration i Lause, i.e. au 
you want Sperry to restore in accordance with the 
provisions of that clause or are you wil : r o 
waive that paragraph and accept all the 
improvement-^ r^- - ie^ K - p e r t , v 
Exhibi: I 
riiii. .tUK-\^. , . . * - * , -v. 
restoration issu> •*; mderstandi :ig or )u; 
position is that you may require Unisys 
restore certain items/areas and w?ive o:..^ t 
ones Unisys position : t. • i - * --< rt ;\-quirec L^ 
restore in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 21. Now that you have had time to 
review the facility first hand and see the 
numerous improvements we have installed, Ifm 
wondering if there is some way you can agree to 
accept those improvements and waive our 
restorati on agreement. 
This language is as close as Olds rame in the 
evidentiary hearing to proving that the restoration hi i^iif inn 
*.9_ 
had been waived--and this language proves just the opposite. 
The fact that Olds might have waived the restoration 
obligation--but did not in fact do so - contributes nothing to 
proving that Olds was entitled to an injunction. 
IV. The Court Did Not Err In Excluding "Course of Dealing" 
Evidence 
Olds argues that the court erred in excluding "course 
of dealing" evidence in support of its contention that Olds 
could waive the restoration requirement. (Olds brief at pgs. 
13, 14). As demonstrated above, the question of whether Olds 
could waive this provision is simply immaterial. Even if this 
court were to reach the technical evidentiary argument made by 
Olds in its brief, however, exclusion of this evidence was not 
error for at least two reasons. First, the evidence was at 
best cumulative. The reason the evidence was offered, 
according to Olds, was to "substantiate" the content of 
exhibits P-6 and P-7. (Olds brief at 14. As the contents of 
those letters were in evidence before the court, and speak for 
themselves, it was not error to exclude additional evidence 
offered merely to bolster that evidence. 
Second, the evidence Olds sought to introduce was not 
in reality regarding any "course of dealing". The evidentiary 
rulings challenged here by Olds appear at (Tr. II. pp. 55-63). 
Those transcript pages are attached as Addendum C for the 
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court's convenience. The transcript shows that the two letters 
were admitted without objection. (Tr. II, p. 55, lines 407; 
Tr. II, p. 61, line 19 thru p. 62, line 4). Olds' counsel then 
tried to get the trial judge to let him use these letters as a 
vehicle to allow Mr. LaGatta (president of Olds) to testify as 
to what another person (Mr. Maguire - Unisys real estate 
manager) believed about the proper interpretation of the lease 
documents. (Tr. II, p. 55, line 18 through p. 56, line 1; Tr. 
II, p. 62 lines 13-19). Olds' counsel then compounded his 
evidentiary problems by trying to elicit the same unfounded and 
self serving opinion regarding another person's understanding 
and intent by asking about "negotiations" between Mr. LaGatta 
and Mr. Maguire. In addition to their insurmountable best 
evidence and foundation problems, these questions were 
immaterial. The "negotiations" (if indeed any occurred outside 
the exchange of letters received in evidence - a point not 
established in the record) must necessarily have taken place in 
1986 and 1987. The "negotiations" concerned what the parties 
might do to resolve their conflicting interpretations of the 
1964 and 1972 lease documents. As the trial judge correctly 
noted, it defies reason for Olds to claim that the parties had 
agreed on an interpretation of the lease documents (Tr. II., p. 
59, line 13 thru p. 60, line 11). As the trial judge also 
correctly observed, the real purpose of this line of questions 
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was to try to allow Mr. LaGatta to make a speech about why the 
lease documents should be interpreted as he wished them to be 
interpreted. 
The Court: What we are doing is spending a lot 
of time -- counsel, of course, objected to the 
defendant [sic] -- objected to this whole 
proceeding because he was afraid of the very 
thing we are now going into because we are trying 
the merits of the case from the plaintiffs' point 
of view as to why the court ought to interpret it 
a certain way and all we are doing is telling the 
Court what this persons believe the 
interpretation is. 
(Tr. II at 63). 
As the profferred evidence was nothing more than Mr. 
LaGratta's opinion as to what the lease documents meant, and 
what he believed some individual at Unisys thought the lease 
meant, there was no error in excluding cumulative evidence 
directed toward an immaterial point. 
V. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Error in Interpreting 
The Attornment Agreement 
Old's final contention on appeal is that the court 
improperly interpreted the effect of the attornment agreement. 
This argument should be rejected because it is inconsistent 
with what Olds argued to the trial court. Early in the 
evidentiary hearing, Unisys argued that para. 10.02 of the 1964 
lease expressly said Unisys remained the owner of the equipment 
and machinery which it had put in the building; and also 
expressly provided that Unisys had the right to remove its 
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equipment and machinery. Unisys argued that the Attornment 
provisions did not preclude para. 10.02 from controlling in 
1986. In response, counsel for Olds interrupted and told the 
court: 
Your honor, maybe I can cut this a little bit 
short. As I said in my opening argument, we 
don't care who owns the property. The operative 
language of the lease that we are talking about 
is all we want is written consent. . . . Now I 
know I am out of order getting up and 
interrupting Mr. Wangsgard, but I think we can 
save the court some time. Who cares who owns the 
property? We think we are right. They think 
they are right. That's for a different day. . . 
I think what we are talking about is a red 
hearing. 
(Tr. II at 24. This position also appears at Tr. II pp. 
10-11). In short, Olds argued below that it should have the 
relief it said it wanted because the attornment provision 
didn't matter. In this court, Olds says it should have the 
relief it now wants because the attornment provision did matter. 
More to the point, however, the interpretation of the 
attornment advanced by Olds is simply not viable. The lease 
agreements, when read together, clearly vest title to 
equipment, machinery, and fixtures in Unisys. The Attornment 
Agreement does not directly address nor indirectly affect that 
ownership interest. 
Paragraph 10.02 of the original Lease plainly and 
clearly states that all equipment, fixtures, and machinery 
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installed in the warehouse remained the property of the lessor, 
and allocates a duty to the lessor to repair any damage to the 
building which may be caused by removal of such fixtures and 
equipment. The clear intention of the provision is that the 
lessee, over the more 20-year term of the lease, was entitled 
to install and remove improvements, fixtures, machinery; 
however, the provision also establishes an affirmative duty on 
the tenant to repair any damage to the building occasioned by 
installation or removal. Thus the provision is in fact a 
pro-landlord provision and must be incorporated into the 
sublease even under the interpretation of the documents given 
by Olds. 
A more fundamental error arises in Olds' 
interpretation of the Attornment Agreement, however. The term 
"attornment" is a legal term of art; "Attornment is an act or 
agreement by which a tenant accepts one person in place of 
another as its landlord. It does not create a new tenancy, 
but rather substitutes a new landlord subject to all the terms 
and conditions of the original lease." Ripples of Clearview, 
Inc. v. Lehavre Associates, 443 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1981)(emphasis 
added). The attornment by definition cannot alter or amend the 
underlying lease. To the extent it purports to do so, no 
consideration exists to support those amendments. Accordingly, 
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the attornment can do nothing more than substitute Olds as 
landlord for the existing lease. 
Even assuming arguendo that the Attornment Agreement 
purports to do more than that, and that such provisions, if 
understood, would be enforceable, the document is at best 
ambiguous. Under Utah law, if language of a writing is subject 
to conflicting interpretation, an interpretation that will 
bring about an equitable result is preferred over an 
interpretation that will result in an inequitable or harsh 
one. First Security Bank of Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078 
(Utah 1985). Similarly, where one interpretation will lead to 
a forfeiture, the court should ordinarily adapt an alternate 
interpretation if possible. See e.g. Wingetts, Inc. v. 
Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007 (Utah, 1972). Green v. Palfreyman, 
166 P.2d 215 (Utah, 1946). 
The interpretation of the attornment proposed by Olds 
would operate as a forfeiture. By unclear and ambiguous 
language which does not even address ownership of equipment, 
machinery and fixtures, Olds argues the attornment agreement 
deprives Unisys of its property rights and forfeits them to 
Olds. This is precisely the result sought to be avoided by the 
rules of construction set forth above. It also places Olds in 
the position of seeking relief from this court which it told 
the court below it was not seeking. 
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The Attornment Agreement is not a model of clarity. 
While it is difficult to discern what the provisions of the 
Attornment Agreement mean, it is clear that the Attornment 
adopts the 1972 sublease as the controlling document. It is 
clear from the provisions of the 1972 sublease, that the 
original lease is subsumed by and incorporated into the terms 
of the sublease. The sublease at Paragraph 17 provides as 
follows: "This sublease is expressly made subject to all the 
terms and conditions of said underlying lease and the lessee 
agrees to use the premises in accordance with the terms of said 
underlying lease.1' Based on that provision of the sublease, 
the original lease is part and parcel of the 1972 sublease and 
accordingly is incorporated by the terms of the Attornment 
Agreement. This is precisely what the court below found. (Tr. 
II at 117, 118). This interpretation of the agreement gives 
credence and effect to the substantive provisions of the lease 
and sublease, without doing violence to the language of those 
agreements, and without resulting in an unintended forfeiture 
of property rights not even addressed by the Attornment 
Agreement. 
Finally, the court based its decision to deny the 
injunction not only on the provisions of the 1964 prime lease, 
but also on the provisions of the 1972 sublease. The Court's 
principle finding rejected Olds' interpretation of paragraph 21 
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of the sublease. The court held that paragraph 21 clearly 
stated that Unisys had a duty to remove "additional alteration 
and construction," and that no prior consent from Olds was 
required. (Tr. II at 117). Paragraph 12 of the Attornment 
Agreement, on which Olds places great reliance, expressly 
states that whatever effect its provisions may have, that 
effect pertains only to the prime lease. Lest any doubt exist 
regarding the continued efficacy of paragraph 21, the 1986 
lease amendment clearly adopts, ratifies and amends paragraph 
21 two years after the date of the attornment. (R.I at 88, 
89). In short, the Attornment Agreement, however construed, 
would not reach one of the most important grounds relied on by 
the trial court in denying the motion for preliminary 
injunction. Accordingly, the court's interpretation of the 
Attornment Agreement was not in error, and must be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
On this appeal Olds must demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in denying Olds' Motion for 
Injunctive Relief. 
Olds has failed to do so. No basis exists on the 
record for reversal of the Court below. The Court committed no 
reversal error on evidentiary rulings raised on appeal, 
properly interpreted the lease documents and properly found no 
irreparable injury. 
-27-
DATED this 10th day of November, 1988. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Joel Momberger 
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50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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SPERRY CORPORATION 
WORLO HEAOOUART6RS 
BLUE BELL PENNSYLVANIA 19424-0001 
TELEPHONE (215) 542-4011 
October 27, 1986 
John H. 0, LaGatta 
Olds & Co., Inc. 
595 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10022 
Re: Sperry Leased Facility 
845 North Overland Drive 
Worth Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. LaGatta: 
Sorry for the delay in responding to your most recent 
correspondence; however, I was waiting for legal counsel to 
review our sublease agreement. 
According to counsel, Sperry is obligated to complete the 
restoration of the facility in accordance with the provisions 
of the restoration paragraph unless you as landlord waive this 
right. It is also their opinion that the restoration should be 
completed by the end of the lease term, can be started at any 
time, and landlord consent is not required. With regard to 
landlord's right to waive, it is limited to waiving of the 
entire clause. 
Sperry is planning to move the current manufacturing operation 
from this location to their main site in Salt Lake city. Plans 
are to have the move completed by April, 1987. At the present 
time we are evaluating the facility and trying to determine how 
best to eliminate or substantially reduce our remaining rental 
obligation. At the present time, Sperry is considering two 
options: (1) Retain real estate brokerage firm and market the 
property as an ongoing manufacturing facility. This, however, 
will require landlord to waive Sperry's restoration obligations 
and provide suitable leasing terms beyond the current Lease. 
(2) Utilize the facility for remote storage or sublease as 
storage space and commence restoration obligations in 
accordance with ongoing needs of the facility. 
In order to proceed with one or the other, it would be helpful 
if you could establish your position on the restoration clause, 
i.e., do you want Sperry to restore in accordance with the 
provisions of that clause or are you willing to waive that 
paragraph and accept all the improvements provided by Sperry. 
If you are agreeable to the latter, it seems to me that we 
could enter into an agreement with a real estate broker so that 
they could market the property on a long term basis. _ _ 
PLAINTIFF'S 
ADDENDUM A ' M H , m T 
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With regard to your inquiry relative to properties Sperry might 
consider a sale/leaseback, at the present time there are no 
properties that are earmarked for a sale/leaseback. If any 
become available*, however, it is unlikely that we would 
consider your firm until we have a satisfactory resolution of 
the North Salt Lake City facility. 
Very truly yours, 
- ' . / / 
E. H. Maguire 
Manager 
Real Estate 
EHM/kmm 
ADDENDUM A 
Corporate Headquarters jrv /^<; v^ urcof j;.o° 
PC ;0C 
Blue oeil PA 19424 0001 
UNISYS 
February 10, 1987 
John H. 0. LaGatta 
Olds & Co., Inc. 
595 Madison Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
Re: Building G - Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. LaGatta: 
First, let m 
secure Hercu 
have chosen 
property bac 
would like t 
of your posi 
certain item 
that we are 
provisions o 
review the f 
improvements 
way you can 
restoration 
e thank you for your cooperation in trying to 
les as a tenant; however, since it appears they 
another building, I am planning to place the 
k on the market for subleasing. First, however, I 
o resolve the restoration issue. My understanding 
tion is that you may require Unisys to restore 
s/areas and waive other ones. Unisys position is 
required to restore in accordance with the 
f paragraph 21. Now that you have had time to 
acility first hand and see the numerous 
we have installed, I'm wondering if there is some 
agree to accept those improvements and waive our 
agreement. 
We are currently in the process of relocating this operation to 
our main site and plan to be totally out of the facility by the 
end of June, 1987. 
I await your comments. 
Very truly yours, 
Edward H. 
Manager 
Real Estate 
/kmm 
A rM"Mr»vrrMTA* T*» 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
<7 
Q 
by your 
A 
Exhibit 
Q 
And was that letter caused to be retrieved from you 
business records? 
It . 
MR. 
No. 6 
MR. 
THE 
(By 
paragraph on 3 
Court a 
things 
one. I 
Edward 
Q 
paragra 
copy < 
THE 
Indeed was. It's this one. 
BLACK: Move for its admission 
WANGSGARD: No objection. 
COURT: It may be admitted. 
of Plaintiff's 
(Whereupon, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 6, previously 
marked for identification, 
was received into evidence.) 
Mr. Black) Calling your attention to the final 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, if I 
of that exhibit. 
might give the 
COURT: I already have one, It's part of the 
we were just talking aboutf isn't it? 
am using the one that is part of the 
Maguire. 
(By 
ph on 
discussion or 
to the 
Exhibit 
Here. Keep that 
affidavit of 
Mr. Black) Calling your attention to the final 
the first page of that exhibit, did you have a 
does the final paragraph of that exhibit refer 
restoration clauses of the sublease that is Plaintiff's 
No. 2 
MR. 
? 
WANGSGARD: I am going to have 
not understand the question, but it seems to 
that th is par 
to object.. I may 
be a question 
agraph of the exhibit speaks for itself. 
qc; 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
MR. BLACK: I would like to read it into the record, 
what it states, and then I will ask Mr. LaGatta what caused 
t he conversation or the negotiations that are a topic of that 
paragraph, if I might. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BLACK: "In order to proceed with one or the 
other, it would be helpful if you could establish your 
position on the restoration clause, i.e., do you want Sperry 
to restore in accordance with the provisions of that clause or 
are you willing to waive that paragraph and accept all the 
improvements provided by Sperry. If you are agreeable to the 
latter, it seems to me that we could enter into an agreement 
with a real estate broker so that they could market the 
property on a long term basis." 
MR. WANGSGARD: I don't know where you are. I don't 
think you are in the exhibit. 
MR. BLACK: Right there at the bottom. 
MR. WANGSGARD: Oh, okay. 
Q (By Mr. Black) That paragraph refers to a 
restoration clause. Wha„t restoration clause is it referring 
to? 
A That would, of course, be the restoration clause in 
the sublease which had become the lease because the other 
lease, the prime lease, was made out of the exhibits. 
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1 
2 
3 
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MR. WANGSGARD: Objection. Foundation. Move the 
answer be stricken. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. The answer may 
be stricken. Proffering information and it's going beyond the 
g question asked. 
MR. BLACK: I'm sorry. What was your objection 
rj based upon? I missed that. I was thinking of — 
Q MR. WANGSGARD: I move the answer be stricken. 
q MR. BLACK: Ask if I could have his objection read, 
10 if I might. 
H (Whereupon, Mr. Wangsgard's objection was read 
12 by the Court Reporter.) 
13 Q (By Mr. Black) And I call your attention to the 
14 restoration language in Paragraph—the final paragraph of 
15 Exhibit 7 that is before you. 
16 MR. WANGSGARD: Counsel, first of all, I think you 
17 are not talking about the final paragraph of Exhibit 7 and— 
18 MR. BLACK: The final paragraph on the first page of 
19 Exhibit 6. 
20 Q (By Mr. Black) I call your attention to the 
21 language referring to the restoration clause. What 
22 restoration clause, if you know, was being discussed in this 
23 letter? 
24 MR. WANGSGARD: O b j e c t i o n . The document speaks fo r 
25 i t s e l f . 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
MR. BLACK: Your Honor, I submit the document 
doesn't speak for itself because there can be many restoration 
clauses and that document does not specifically refer to a 
restoration clause. 
MR. WANGSGARD: But, this document has to speak for 
itself because what he is purporting to do is to have 
Mr. LaGatta tell the Court what another person intended when 
they used those words in this letter. That's why the letter 
needs to speak for itself and we shouldn't have other 
witnesses trying to explain what somebody else meant. 
MR. BLACK: Why don't I rephrase the question. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Mr. LaGatta, had you previously had 
discussions with Mr. Maguire regarding the restoration clause 
referred to on the last paragraph of the first page of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7? 
A Yes. 
Q And would you recount to the Court in general, the 
terms of those discussions, if you can, date of the 
discussions and where you had them with Mr. Maguire. 
MR. WANGSGARD: Just a second. Objection. 
Immaterial. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. We seem to be 
now talking about what the negotiations are between the 
parties; are we not? 
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1 MR. BLACK: Yes, we are, your Honor. We are talking 
2 about the negotiations of the parties subsequent to entering 
3 into the contract regarding what the restoration clause meant 
4 and for whose benefit it was for. I submit that is not only 
5 material but it's highly probative of what a reasonable 
6 interpretation of Paragraph 21 of the sublease is concerned 
7 with. 
8 MR. WANGSGARD: It's immaterial unless they are 
9 going to claim that those negotiations amended the legal 
10 binding documents* They can talk about what they mean all day 
11 unless they are claiming that they changed it. It doesn't 
12 make any difference. 
13 MR. BLACK: If I might answer that, your Honor. V7e 
14 are using that to show interpretation placed upon that clause 
15 by the parties. Now, we don't believe that is parole evidence 
16 and the definition of parole evidence if evidence prior or 
17 contemporaneous with the transaction when it was entered into. 
18 Now, the Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, on 
19 numerous occasions, stated that when the parties arrived at a 
20 construction or interpretation of the documents, that is the 
21 construction interpretation that will be given the document 
22 and I would be happy to cite cases on it. 
23 THE COURT: No. You can't honestly tell me the 
24 parties agreed on the construction of any paragraph in this 
25 case, can you? 
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MR. BLACK: I think that we can because I think 
there's additional correspondence. 
THE COURT: Let me ask counsel. Is he speaking for 
you? 
MR. WANGSGARD: He certainly is not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I know he can't be speaking for him 
because I read the documents, too. 
MR. BLACK: I think this shows that the parties had 
an understanding of what the agreement was. 
MR. WANGSGARD: It's just immaterial. 
THE COURT: The Court will sustain the objection. 
Q (By Mr. Black) I hand you what has been marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7. Would you please identify that 
document. 
MR. WANGSGARD: May I see what you are talking 
about, please? 
THE COURT: What are you talking about so the Court 
can refer to it? 
MR. BLACK: I will give the Court a copy in just a 
second. 
THE COURT: That's not what I already have? 
MR. BLACK: That's correct. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Would you identify that document, 
please. 
A- Yes. This is a Unisys—Mr. Maguire's letter of 
60 
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x February 10, 1987 where he thanks me for cooperation with a 
P prospective tenant and talks at length about restoration and 
3 me waiving restoration, et cetera. 
4 Q Now, was this correspondence based upon prior 
g conversations with Mr. Maguire? 
A It was in the series, yes, sir. 
7 1 Q Series of conversations. And the last two lines of 
3 the first paragraph refers to a waive of the restoration 
9 agreement on behalf of Mr.—apparently, on behalf of Unisys. 
10 D o y° u have any understanding of what was intended? 
11 A Well, yes. 
12 MR. WANGSGARD: Objection. No foundation. The 
13 document, if we are going to do anything with the document, it 
14 ought to come in. What is happening now is that he is trying 
15 t o 9 e t around the best evidence rule and the fact that the 
16 document speaks for itself by putting documents in his hand, 
17 identifying it and then trying to get the information in as if 
18 it were evidence. 
19 The only way this information can come in as 
20 evidence—I will stipulate to it 'for that purpose and the 
21 document speaks for itself. Any other proceeding is improper 
22 and I certainly object to it. 
23 MR. BLACK: Apparently it has been stipulated to its 
24 admission. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. It may be admitted on 
stipulation. 
(Whereupon, Plaintiff1s 
Exhibit No. 7, having 
previously been marked for 
identification, was 
received into evidence.) 
Q (By Mr. Black) Mr. LaGatta, you indicated you had a 
series of conversations with Mr. Maguire involving 
negotiations regarding the restoration clause of the sublease; 
is that correct? 
A Restoration, maintenance and many other things. 
Q Had Mr, Maguire discussed previously with you the 
waiver of restoration under the sublease? 
A Yes. 
Q And did he believe it was your right to waive 
restoration under the sublease? 
A Yes. 
MR. WANGSGARD: Objection as to what Mr. Maguire 
believed and move the answer be stricken. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. We will strike 
the answer. 
Q (By Mr. Black) Did he state to you that Olds 
Properties could waive the restoration clause of the sublease? 
MR. WANGSGARD: Objection. Immaterial. 
THE COURT: Sustain the objection. 
MR. BLACK: Immaterial to whether they thought that 
they could waive restoration? That's the precise issue before 
e: 
1 the Court, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Just a minute. It's not the precise 
3 issue before the Court. What we are doing is spending a lot 
4 of time—counsel, of course, objected to the defendant--
5 objected to this whole proceeding because he was afraid of the 
6 very thing that we are now going into because v/e are trying 
7 the merits of the case from the plaintiff's point of view as 
8 to why the Court ought to interpret it a certain way and all 
9 we are doing is telling the Court what this persons believe 
10 the interpretation is. We are really not trying to decide 
11 what the original transaction provided, you see. That is the 
12 real thing I have to decide. I will hold you to a very fine 
13 line. It won't get away from us. 
14 MR. BLACK: I understand your concern, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And while we are having concern, I will 
16 take a five-minute recess. 
17 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.) 
18 Q (By Mr. Black) Mr. LaGatta, I hand you what has 
19 been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10. Would you please 
20 identify that document. 
21J A Yes. I recognize it. 
Q Was that document retrieved from your business 22 
23 records as you previously described you maintain them? 
24 
25 
A Yes. 
Q Who is it from? 
